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Abstract
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Policy Research Working Paper 5610
The paper provides an assessment of the state of 
financial inclusion in the MENA region, and identifies 
constraints, opportunities, and priorities for significantly 
improving access to finance. Practical recommendations 
for improving financial inclusion are outlined. Firstly, 
governments could agree a Financial Inclusion Strategy 
that is underpinned by improved data, that has both 
public and private sector commitment, and that scales 
up financial access on a large scale, principally through 
bank accounts. Secondly, the regulators should provide 
a legal and supervisory framework that enables access 
to finance to be expanded primarily through banks, 
This paper is a product of the Financial and Private Sector Development Unit, Middle East and North Africa Region. It 
is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development 
policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.
org. The author may be contacted at dpearce@worldbank.org. 
but with regulatory space for the use of agents, mobile 
phone technology, and for a finance company model for 
microcredit and leasing. Interest rate caps on microloans 
should be removed, and instead consumer protection 
and supervisory capacity for microfinance should be 
strengthened, while prudent competition between 
financial service providers should be promoted. Thirdly, 
financial infrastructure needs to continue to be a focus 
area, and in particular credit information and secured 
transactions. Finally, barriers to the growth of Islamic 
financial services should be removed so that they can 
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1.  Overview  
 
Financial Inclusion is critical for the competitiveness of the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region, for employment creation, and for raising incomes and reducing poverty. 
Financial inclusion is through access to financial services such as credit, bank accounts, deposits, 
payments services, insurance, and pensions. Firms need access to financial services to be able to 
invest, innovate, take advantage of market opportunities, manage cash flow and costs, and reduce 
risks. Microenterprises constitute the vast majority of enterprises in MENA and are a significant 
employer (92.5 percent of enterprises in the case of Egypt, and 63.6 percent share of private 
employment
1). Individuals and households benefit from financial inclusion through a safe place 
to save, safer and cheaper access to remittances and other payments, loans or insurance payments 
to  cover  health  or  education  expenses,  and  pensions  for  old  age.  High  levels  of  financial 
exclusion hinder efforts to bring enterprises into the formal sector, and to increase investment 
and trade. 
 
The G20 leaders committed to ‘improving access to financial services for the poor’ at the 
Pittsburgh summit in  September 2009,  and set-up a Financial  Inclusion  Experts  Group with 
World Bank Group support. The G20 Leadership Summit in Toronto in June 2010 endorsed the 
“Principles for Innovative Financial Inclusion” that the Group developed. The UN committee on 
building inclusive financial sectors urged central banks and governments in 2006 to add the goal 
of universal financial inclusion to the traditional goals of  prudential regulation and financial 
system stability.  Universal access to finance has been adopted as a goal by India, Pakistan, 
South Africa, Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, Malaysia and a number of European countries.  
 
While most MENA countries have taken steps to improve financial inclusion, there has not 
yet been a comprehensive high level commitment to financial inclusion across much of the 
region.  Financial inclusion is a policy focus for several MENA countries, although it is not yet a 
priority objective alongside stability for MENA financial regulators and ministries of finance. 
Five MENA countries now have a financial inclusion strategy, and with three of these adopted 
since 2006 this seems to be a growing trend for region.   
  
The enabling environment for financial inclusion in MENA has improved in the past two 
years,  but  is  still  weak  overall.  Deficiencies  in  financial  infrastructure  and  regulatory 
frameworks make expanding access to finance costly and risky for banks. Lenders have to rely 
on collateral that is expensive to register and may not be readily enforceable, and on outdated 
credit assessment and risk management techniques. Credit information is improving in quality 
and  availability  throughout  MENA,  as  credit  registries  are  improved  and  credit  bureaus 
established, but most microfinance institutions (MFIs) do not yet report to or have access to 
them. Interest rate caps on micro loans act as a disincentive for banks and investors, and limit 
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their growth.  Investment in microfinance providers is constrained by the predominance of an 
NGO or association model, and by a lack or regulatory and supervisory clarity.  Borrowers face 
higher pricing and many otherwise creditworthy individuals are excluded from access to finance.   
 
The paper provides an assessment of the state of financial inclusion in the MENA region, 
and identifies constraints, opportunities, and priorities for significantly improving access to 
finance.   The  paper first  provides an assessment and overview of financial inclusion in  the 
MENA  region,  including  the  structure,  performance  and  characteristics  of  the  microfinance 
sector.    The  framework  for  financial  inclusion  is  the  focus  of  the  next  section,  covering 
regulation and supervision, financial infrastructure, and government policies and programs.  
 
Recommendations for improving Financial Inclusion in the MENA region are outlined in the 
final section.  The priority recommendations are firstly to agree a Financial Inclusion Strategy 
that is underpinned by improved data, that has both public and private sector commitment, and 
that scales up financial access on a large scale, principally through bank accounts.  Secondly, the 
paper recommends that regulators should provide a legal and supervisory framework that enables 
access to finance to be expanded primarily through banks, but with regulatory space for the use 
of  agents,  mobile  phone  technology,  and  for  a  finance  company  model  for  microcredit  and 
leasing.  The  paper  advocates  removing  interest  rate  caps  on  microloans,  and  instead 
strengthening consumer protection and supervisory capacity for microfinance, while stimulating 
competition between financial service providers.  Thirdly, continued improvements to financial 
infrastructure  are  encouraged,  particularly  with  regard  to  credit  information  and  to  secured 
transactions. Finally the paper highlights the need to enable growth in Islamic financial services 
to meet market demand.  
 
2.  Financial Inclusion in MENA 
2.1  State of Financial Inclusion in MENA  
Financial sector depth is not matched by Access. The MENA region has greater financial 
depth – as measured by private credit as a proportion of GDP – than all other regions except for 
OECD countries and East Asia. However, this is not reflected in similarly high levels of access 
to financial services. MENA lags several regions on the key indicators of bank deposits and 
loans accounts per population (see regional comparisons in table 1, and country comparisons in 
Annex A1.1).  Just over one fifth (21.3 percent) of adults in MENA have a loan account with a 
bank, although this does not account for individuals that have more than one loan (the real figure 
is therefore likely to be lower). Access to bank deposits varies from 10.4 percent for Yemen and 
19.2 percent for Syria, to the other end of the spectrum with more than one bank deposit account 
for each adult in Oman, Lebanon, UAE and Iran (Annex A1.1).
2 
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Table 1. Access Indicators by Region 
Region 
Banks Deposit Accounts 
per 1000 adults 
Banks Loan Accounts per 
1000 adults 
Private Credit as 
% of GDP 
Sub-Saharan Africa  315.5  87.5  23.7 
South Asia  653.8  54.2  43.9 
Middle East & North 
Africa  744.0  213.3  50.6 
Europe & Central Asia  1,395.4  325.2  45.8 
East Asia & Pacific  1,116.9  343.9  58.4 
Latin America & Caribbean  1,227.5  366.8  44.7 
High income: non OECD  1,865.0  851.5  83.4 
High income: OECD  2,383.7  702.4  130.8 
Source: CGAP and World Bank Financial Access 2010, International Financial Statistics 
 
MENA countries tend to underperform on access to SME lending compared to financial 
sector depth and relative to countries with similar GDP levels, as illustrated in figures 1 and 
2.  MENA  financial  systems  are  bank-dominated  (bank  assets  were  63.6  percent  of  GDP  in 
2008), and banks lend to a narrow set of clients, including the government and larger corporates.  
MENA countries also tend to have relatively low access to deposits compared to GDP per head.  
 
































































































Private Credit as % of GDP7 
 
Figure 2. Bank Deposit Accounts per population against Financial Sector Depth and GDP 
per capita  
 
Sources: CGAP and World Bank Financial Access 2010, International Financial Statistics, World Development Indicators. Iran data for 2008, 




Financial inclusion in the MENA region is characterized by NGO-dominated microcredit 
sectors, postal networks and state banks. A few countries have introduced legislation that 
allows for other legal forms of microfinance provider, such as finance companies or banks, but 
as yet there are few microfinance institutions that are legally allowed to offer (voluntary) deposit 
services in MENA.  Savings and loan cooperatives are not a major source of financial services in 
much of the MENA region.  Table A1.3 (Annex 1) sets out a typology of microfinance providers 
presented in table form. „Industry‟ is defined here as the set of providers of financial services to 
low income and microenterprise clients. 
 
Banks and Financial Inclusion 
Direct commercial bank involvement in microfinance in the MENA region is very limited. 
Banks prefer to provide wholesale financing through specialized microcredit providers. Bank-
microcredit provider linkages build on the relative strengths of both types of entity – banks are 
able to raise funds from deposits and from the market and often have excess funds looking for 
returns,  while  MFIs  are  closer  to  clients,  have  tailored  lending  methodologies  and  delivery 
mechanisms, and lack funds.   One of the big three Lebanese MFIs, Ameen, provides financial 
services  in  partnership  with  four  Lebanese  banks.  Moroccan  banks  have  set-up  microcredit 
associations or foundations, rather than provide microloans directly.  In Egypt two private sector 
banks offer microcredit in cooperation with microfinance service companies.  
 
State  banks  are  significant  providers  of  financial  services  for  low  income  people  and 
microenterprises in some MENA countries. In Algeria, for example, the top 3 providers of 
loans  to  micro  and  small  enterprises  are  public  banks,  with  private  banks  and  NGOs 
(associations) far behind, although the market share for private banks was growing (IFC survey, 
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the large public bank, Commercial Bank of Syria.  For loans to MSEs, public banks were also the 
leading providers – Real Estate Bank, Popular Credit Bank, and Commercial Bank of Syria.  
 
State  banks  hold  a  significant  proportion  of  financial  service  outlets  in  several  MENA 
countries,  including  Syria,  Algeria,  Tunisia,  Egypt  and  Iraq.    The  Principal  Bank  for 
Development and Agricultural Credit (PDBAC) is the state agricultural bank in Egypt, and has 
more  than  1200  branches  and  23,000  employees  throughout  the  country  outside  of  Cairo, 
providing  deposit  services;  payments  services;  foreign  currency  services  and  passbooks, 
machinery  and  equipment  loans  and  lending  for  agriculture  and  other  food  production 
enterprises.  In Iraq over two thirds (69 percent) of the bank branch network is owned by the two 
large state banks, Rafidain and Rasheed. 
 
Microfinance  banks,  or  specialized  microfinance  institutions,  are  an  alternative  model 
where regulations allow. Instead of relying on banks for deposits and commercial borrowing, 
microfinance banks can intermediate their own funds.  AGFUND and the Aga Khan Agency for 
Microfinance  are  committed  to  establishing  microfinance  „banks‟  as  specialized  financial 
institutions  that  provide  a  broad  range  of  financial  services  to  low  income  people  and 
microenterprises, on a sustainable basis.  AGFUND has set-up MFIs in Jordan, Egypt, Bahrain, 
Syria and Yemen. For example, Al Amal microfinance bank was established under the Yemen 
microfinance law, and offers deposit and lending services to low income clients, including micro 
and small enterprises. Al Amal started operations in 2008, and now has nine branches, 12,000 
active  clients  (half  of  whom  are  savers).  A  money  exchange  company  in  Yemen  has  also 
reportedly converted to a microfinance bank, Al Kurami. The Aga Khan Foundation has set-up a 
deposit-taking  microfinance  institution  in  Syria,  which  has  some  characteristics  of  a 
microfinance bank microfinance bank, as a Social Financial Banking Institution.  Under Syria‟s 
General Microfinance Decree such an institution is allowed to provide microlending, deposit-
taking, and micro insurance.  
 
Microcredit in MENA 
 
Microcredit
3 is still limited in scale in much of the region.  The market coverage ratio for 
specialized  microfinance  providers  is  only  half  (1.78  percent)  the  proportion  of  the  adult 
population as is the case for South Asia or Latin America.
4  As indicated in Table 2, the number 
of active borrowers compared to working age adults is much smaller than all regions except sub-
Saharan Africa, while microcredit loan portfolios represent a significantly smaller proportion of 
total credit
5 than any other region.   
                                                           
3 Defined by the World Bank and CGAP as having an average outstanding loan size less than three times GDP per 
capita. 
4 Data for Microfinance Institutions that report to the Microfinance International Exchange.  
5 Domestic private credit to the real sector by banks. 9 
 
















2,807,116  1.99  1,505,414,132  0.47 
East Asia & Pacific  160  11,294,660  4.74  5,195,228,561  6.12 
Europe & Central Asia  263  2,603,513  4.11  9,375,908,169  5.37 
Latin America & Caribbean  327  12,781,340  4.93  15,334,944,785  7.14 
South Asia  148  39,274,147  5.90  4,293,510,584  4.72 
Sub-Saharan Africa  208  6,732,155  1.48  3,162,740,041  4.71 
Source: Microfinance Information Exchange Database and Sanabel. Data for MENA is for 2009, other regions 2008.  
There  were  2.81  million  microcredit  borrowers  at  the  end  of  2008,  with  a  total  loan 
portfolio of US$1.5 billion. Microcredit is concentrated in two countries: in 2009 47 percent of 
the region‟s microcredit borrowers were in Egypt and 33 percent in Morocco (the order was 
reversed from 2008, when Egypt had 40 percent and Morocco 44 percent).
6 In terms of clients 
per population and microcredit portfolio as a proportion of total bank lending to the private 
sector, Morocco still has the highest rates of microcredit access in the region, although this 
should be viewed in the context of Morocco‟s low level of access to bank loans. Morocco also 
stands out in terms of MFI branch networks, comprising 83 percent of the region‟s reported total. 
(MIX, CGAP, Sanabel, 2010)  Jordan has the highest microcredit coverage of its poor population 
in the region. Tunisia and West Bank & Gaza have the only other microcredit sectors of any 
notable size in the region, although microcredit is growing in scale in Yemen, Iraq, and Syria.  























Egypt  14  868,315  55.7  165,018,626  1.69  5.8  0.24 
Iraq  4  27,708  14.7  16,122,827  0.16     0.45 
Jordan  7  134,037  84.1  121,578,626  3.7  65.6  0.68 
Lebanon  3  23,678  32.8  20,584,560  0.84     0.1 
Morocco  9  1,241,957  46.3  695,647,381  5.96  28.1  1.08 
WB/G  8  34,265  43.2  79,727,913  1.68       
Syria  2  22,149  31.4  15,682,015  0.18  7.2  0.04 
Tunisia  1  94,959  76.7  33,999,508  1.32     0.14 
Yemen  6  24,976  95.8  3,241,486  0.2  0.2  0.16  
Sources: MIX database, WDI, IFS 2008 data. „GLP‟: gross (microcredit) loan portfolio. Total credit: Domestic private credit to the real sector by 
banks. 
                                                           
6 Sanabel, 2010. These statistics do not include Mauritania and Sudan, which are included in Sanabel regional totals.  10 
 
 
Microcredit is concentrated in a relatively small number of leading institutions.  The top 5 
MFIs in MENA represent 43 percent of total outreach, and 3 of these are from Morocco (Annex 
A2.4 has a country breakdown by borrowers and by loan portfolio). 70 percent of microfinance 
institution  (MFI)  branches  are  in  Morocco.    Microcredit  is  not  well  developed  in  the  Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, where only Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have microfinance 
institutions that report to the regional microfinance network (Sanabel). 
 
After years of overall slow growth, the rate of growth of the microcredit sector in MENA 
finally started to catch up with global growth rates between 2006 and 2008.  Worldwide 
growth rates recorded by the Micro Banking Bulletin
7 were 21 percent for borrowers and 35 
percent  for  portfolio,  whereas  for  the  MENA  region  they  were  19  percent  and  30  percent 
respectively.  Outreach contracted in 2009 by 3 percent (78,785 borrowers), although total loan 
portfolio  increased  marginally,  driven  primarily  by  a  decline  in  the  size  of  the  Moroccan 
microfinance  sector.  This  was  a  consequence  of  reconsolidation  and  losses  following  the 
microfinance over-indebtedness crisis in Morocco, which is explored in more detail in Annex 5. 
The total number of microcredit borrowers in Morocco more than doubled from 2005 to 2007, 
but then fell by almost a third from 2007 to 2009.  Growth rates for individual Arab countries 
varied, with the highest rates in 2009 recorded in Iraq (45 percent) and Lebanon (37 percent). 
(see Annex tables A2.1, A2.2 for growth rates by country).   
 
Microcredit in MENA reaches relatively poor clients compared to other regions (except 
Asia), and a reasonably high proportion of women, at 63 percent of total microcredit borrowers 
(although only 31% employees of Sanabel member MFIs are female). The proportion of women 
microcredit  clients  ranges  from  as  low  as  18  percent  in  Iraq,  where  female  workforce 
participation has declined since the most recent conflict, to as high as 81 percent in Yemen and 
83 percent in Jordan where many MFIs target women as part of their mission. Table 4 compares 
24 larger and better performing MFIs from across MENA with their counterparts globally, on 
outreach, gender, efficiency and portfolio quality. 









Portfolio at Risk 
(>30 days)  
MENA  15.8  65.4  21.4  2.4 
Africa  67.8  57.2  32.7  4.7 
Asia  17.8  93.8  17.2  1.5 
ECA  68.3  43.1  15  2.0 
LAC  25.5  59.6  22.3  4.2 
Source: 2008 MFI Benchmarks MIX Micro Banking Bulletin. Median values. Outreach is average loan balance per borrower/GNI per capita.  
                                                           
7 The Bulletin has a database of 600 microfinance institutions from 84 countries, including most of the leading 
institutions by size and performance as recorded by the Microfinance Information Exchange. 11 
 
Reported portfolio quality in MENA is generally good, with the exception of Morocco and 
West Bank/Gaza.  Portfolio at  risk (measured at  30 days,  a  relatively  conservative measure 
typical of microfinance) has been broadly stable in recent years, and averaged 3.9 percent for 
MENA  in  2009.  (Sanabel  2010)  This  is  despite  the  decline  in  the  quality  of  the  Moroccan 
microcredit portfolio. MFIs in MENA are relatively „profitable‟, with a higher average return on 
assets than MFIs in other regions.
8  This is driven by low expenses, high efficiency levels, and 
initial (zero cost) donor funding.  Financial revenues are also low, and this relative profitability 
does not seem to be a factor of high interest rates (which do not tend to be high by global 




Postal savings banks and post offices continue to be the primary providers of savings and 
payment services for low income people in the region. There are 6 postal networks providing 
financial services in MENA, which were all state entities.  Egypt Post is the largest provider of 
savings products to Egyptian micro entrepreneurs and lower income population, serving over 17 
million clients through 3,700 outlets nationwide, including with savings, payments and domestic 
transfer services, although not with microcredit. The largest bank network, PBDAC (the state 
agricultural bank) has over 1200 branches and outlets, by comparison. While the numbers in 
Yemen are smaller, the Post and Postal Savings Corporation has 310 branches, which is more 
than the total number of branches of commercial banks. Tunisian MFIs and the postal service 
combined have 20 times more branches in rural areas than banks do. (CGAP and World Bank 
Financial Access 2009; M Khaled, pers. comm.) 
 
Post office branch networks are in many cases among the most extensive delivery channels 
for financial services in MENA, as noted earlier. The Moroccan post office, for example, 
provided basic financial services (savings passbooks and checking accounts) to a large customer 
base (more than 2.5 million people). In recent years, it has successfully leveraged on the large 
postal network (1,762 branches in 2008) to attract a significant number of unbanked and rural 
customers (14 percent of the Moroccan population have postal accounts in 2008, up from 10 
percent in 2005).   
 
Financial Inclusion and the Global Financial Crisis 
 
Loans to GDP declined in MENA in 2009 as a result of the crisis (with Tunisia a notable 
exception) for both loans and deposits, due to falls in commercial bank lending. Deposit volumes 
also fell, with some exceptions, while the number of deposit accounts continued to rise. This 
                                                           
8 Microbanking Bulletin data. It should be noted that MFIs reporting to the Microbanking Bulletin, as to the 
Microfinance Information Exchange, do so on a voluntary basis. Stronger and larger MFIs are therefore more likely 
to provide data than small and poor performing MFIs.  12 
 
phenomenon of continued growth in access to deposits despite falls in overall deposits, was also 
a feature in other regions, except for those affected most severely by the global financial crisis 
(such as Eastern Europe and Central Asia), where both fell. (CGAP and World Bank Financial 
Access, 2010) 
 
Microfinance  in  MENA  was  not  directly  affected  by  the  global  financial  crisis  though.  
Microfinance markets have not generally reached an equilibrium between demand and supply, as 
reflected in high unmet levels of demand for microfinance, and the apparent lack of sensitivity to 
high interest rates (although rates in the MENA region are typically lower than other regions).  In 
most  markets  microfinance  volumes  are  primarily  a  function  of  funding  available  to 
microfinance institutions, and of the capacity of MFIs to expand sustainably and manage risks.  
Funding levels for MFIs were maintained throughout the crisis, with the exception of falls in 
donor funding to microfinance in Egypt and Morocco that were due to non-crisis factors, so the 
microfinance  sector  in  MENA  was  fairly  well  insulated  from  the  global  financial  crisis.  
Microcredit  NGOs  also  did  not  have  investment  portfolios  or  direct  exposure  to  complex 
financial instruments, depending primarily on donor funding and straightforward bank loans. 
 
2.2  Financial Products for low income customers and microenterprises 
Access to finance in MENA tends to be narrow, with most microfinance providers not able to 
offer transaction accounts, payments, housing loans, sight deposits, term deposits, or insurance 
products.  Financial  inclusion  will  continue  to  be  constrained  until  regulatory  reforms  and 
financial  infrastructure  improvements  allow  banks  and  regulated  microfinance  providers  to 
expand outreach to low income customers and microenterprises at a lower cost and risk.   
The  vast  majority  (94  percent)  of  microloans  made  by  MENA  MFIs  are  intended  for 
microenterprise  activities  (Sanabel  2010),  although  given  that  money  is  fungible  this  is  a 
questionable distinction. The majority of microloans are also made through solidarity groups
9 
(65 percent of all microfinance borrowers).  While most MFIs in MENA are credit-only, and not 
able to offer a broader range of financial services, there has still been some product innovation, 
particularly  in  more mature markets  such as  Jordan, Yemen, Egypt.  Loan products  are now 
offered for housing, agriculture and consumption, as well as for the microenterprise activities 
that are the primary focus. MFIs in Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon also offer credit life insurance 
products,  as  agents  or  contact  points  for  insurance  companies.    A  third  of  MFIs  also  offer 
training and consulting services. Less than a fifth offer fund transfer services, given restrictions 




                                                           
9 Groups of borrowers that co-guarantee each other. 13 
 
Figure 3. Microfinance Products offered by MENA MFIs 
 
Source: Sanabel 2010 (2008 data) 
 
Microsavings are offered on a very limited scale in the region, and are only found in West 
Bank & Gaza, Syria, and Yemen and only offered by a few institutions.  Al Amal Microfinance 
„Bank‟  in  Yemen,  for  example,  offers  sight  deposits,  child  savings  accounts,  and  also  time 
deposits, as well as Shariah-compliant insurance on loans (Takaful). Micro insurance for health 
and  education  (beyond  standard  death  and  disability  protection  offered  by  many  MFIs  on 
microloans) is being introduced by leading microfinance NGOs in Egypt and service companies, 
as service agents for insurance companies (Allianz and Alico).   
Trade credit (credit provided by other firms) is used by many micro and small enterprises 
in the MENA region.  A significant proportion of micro and small enterprises interviewed for 
IFC microfinance country reports in 2006-2008 reported accessing supplier credit, and most paid 
little or no interest charges. Half of micro and small enterprises surveyed for the IFC in Yemen 
(205 out of 405), 39.5 percent of those surveyed by Syria, 40.7 percent of those interviewed in 
Algeria, and 40.7 percent of those in Lebanon, used some form of supplier credit to acquire 
supplies, whether as an advance with balance upon receipt, or making a delayed cash payment 
after delivery.
10  
Islamic financing instruments comprise only a small fraction of microfinance supply.  In 
Syria for example they comprised only 3 percent of outstanding microfinance loans in 2006.  
Providers of  Islamic  microfinance  also  tend to  be small in  size.  Indonesia,  Bangladesh, and 
Afghanistan – none of which are in MENA – account for 80 percent of the global outreach of 
                                                           
10 Sources: IFC, 2007, Assessment of MSE Financial Needs in Yemen; IFC, 2006, Access to Finance Study in 
Algeria; IFC, 2008, Lebanon: A Diagnostic Study on the Demand for Financial Services by Micro and Small 
Entrepreneurs. 

















Islamic microfinance. Leading countries for Islamic microfinance in MENA include Lebanon 
and Yemen (CGAP, 2008).  Yet IFC-commissioned market studies in the MENA region suggest 
a  strong  demand  for  Islamic  microfinance  products.    Between  20  and  60  percent  of  those 
interviewed  (microenterprises,  low  income  individuals)  indicated  a  preference  for  Shariah-
compliant products.  For some the lack of Shariah-compliant products is an absolute constraint to 
financial access, while for others this is  a preference and they continue to use conventional 
financial services in the absence of competitive Islamic ones.  
The range of Islamic finance products offered is narrow - over 70 percent of the Islamic 
finance products offered are murabaha (cost plus), which is a lending product typically used for 
working capital. Most MFIs in Yemen offer a murabaha loan product, for example. However, 
there are some signs  that this  limited  selection  may increase:  in  Egypt, Bank Misr plans to 
introduce  Islamic  microfinance  activities  to  its  33  Islamic  branches,  and  also  develop  a 
mudaraba  (profit sharing agreement) product in addition to the murabaha product; in Yemen 
Tadhamon Islamic Bank opened a MSE division in late 2006; and in the UAE Noor Islamic 
Bank and Emirates Post Holding Group announced plans to establish a company to offer Sharia-
compliant financial services to low income clients.  
Constraints  to  Islamic  microfinance  are  mostly  related  to  i)  the  capacity  of  microfinance 
providers to design authorized Islamic finance products that meet the needs of clients, and ii) the 
need to keep costs low for micro-level transactions. Islamic microfinance providers globally are 
still in the process of identifying innovations and adaptations to Islamic finance that lower costs 
and enable them to offer sufficiently attractive pricing to clients.  Islamic microfinance can be 
more reliant on collateral to secure loans, rather than on cash flow-based financing techniques, 
and as such is more affected by weak collateral registration and enforcement regimes.  There can 
also  be  a  stronger  tendency  in  Islamic  jurisprudence  to  give  borrowers  more  time  and 
opportunity to repay, rather than executing collateral.  
 
2.3  Delivery mechanisms for financial services 
Bank branch networks are correlated with access to loans and deposit accounts.  
As shown in Figures 4 and 5, the number of deposit and loan accounts relative to the population 
in MENA is closely linked to the size of branch networks.
11 The number of deposit accounts per 
population does not seem positively related to the proportion of the branch network held by state 
banks  (Figure  7)  though,  despite  a  widespread  assumption  that  state  banks  have  deeper 
penetration in areas not covered by private banks and therefore can contribute to overall gains in 
access. 
 
                                                           
11 As shown in Annex 1.4, the relationship between number of deposits and branches holds even after controlling for 
per capita income, although it should be noted that the regression results are only suggestive, given the very small 
sample, and the endogeneity of the branch variables. 15 
 
Figures 4 and 5. Deposits and Loans per Population against Branch Networks 
 
 
Figure 6. Deposits/population vs. Per Capita Income.  Figure 7. Deposits/population vs. State Bank Networks 
 
   
Source: CGAP and World Bank Financial Access 2010 
 
While  branches  facilitate  a  range  of  financial  services,  and  can  enable  a  personalized 
service  to  clients,  ‘branchless’  outlets  such  as  ATMs  and  point-of-sale  devices  also  be 
effective delivery mechanisms not only for withdrawals but also for payments and deposits, at a 
considerably lower cost than branches.  While MENA is typically at or below the averages for 
ATM  access  for  other  developing  regions,  access  through  point-of  sale  (POS)  devices  is 
relatively more widespread in MENA. Population densities, income levels, telecommunications 
networks, banking sector development, and Government policy all influence the density of touch 
points in the region, as elsewhere.  ATM networks in the GCC countries are relatively dense and 
well developed (tables A3.1 and A3.2 have more ATM and POS detail).   
The MENA region reported the second highest increase (24 percent) in ATM networks in 
2009 globally, after South Asia (64 percent).  MENA‟s relative density of branches, ATMs and 
points of sale devices are illustrated in table 5.  Iran, UAE, Oman and Lebanon have the highest 
levels  of branch density per population,  while  Lebanon has  (by far) the highest  density  per 



































































































































































































Percentage of state branches16 
 
 


















SSA  5.1  5.8  11.7  12  5,695.1  1,801.1 
SA  6.5  18.1  5.2  11.2  39.6  80.8 
EAP  11.8  6.5  25.3  21.3  352.3  185.2 
MENA  14.3  11.8  31.1  21.4  641.3  774.7 
GCC  17.1  7.6  63.3  28.3  739.3  627.9 
non GCC  13.1  13.7  16.8  18.4  608.6  823.6 
LAC  15.8  15  44.1  32.6  881.6  871.2 
HI: non OECD  19.8  254.4  78.9  511  1,833.2  22,227.1 
ECA  21.4  13.8  43.6  24.3  667.6  405.5 
HI: OECD  33.4  35.9  103.2  101.5  2,293.9  2,243.3 




Mobile banking has the potential to be transformational because it: i) uses existing mobile 
communications infrastructure which already reaches unbanked people, ii) may be driven by new 
players, such as telecommunications companies, with different target markets from traditional 
banks, iii) may harness the power of new distribution networks for cash transactions, such as 
airtime merchants, beyond the conventional merchant POS or ATM networks of banks, and iv) 
may  be  cheaper  than  conventional  banking,  if  the  offering  is  competitive.  (Porteous,  2006)  
CGAP  research  comparing  service  provides  between  banks  and  branchless  banking  service 
providers indicates that mobile banking services can be up to 50 percent cheaper (see Annex 3.4 
for cost comparisons).   
 
Mobile banking
12 has been used primarily for payments and transactions so far, and not for 
loans or savings, although pilots are underway to develop credit and deposit products through 
mobile  phones.  Using  a  mobile  phone  for  more  complex  transactions  than  payments  and 
transfers requires a different pricing structure (customers are unlikely to want to pay transfer-
level fees to make a loan repayment), and also implies that regulators need to understand any 
risks that are involved, and to adapt supervisory practices and legal frameworks as appropriate. 
The functionality of using a small keyboard and screen can also be seen as less convenient than 
using a branch or computer, even if mobile phones are much more easily accessible.  
 
                                                           
12 Mobile phone payments are financial transactions undertaken using a mobile device such as a cellular phone. 
Mobile banking includes mobile payments but involves access by mobile device to the broader range of banking 
services, such as account-based savings or transactions products offered by banks.  17 
 
High potential countries for mobile phone banking in MENA include Egypt, Yemen and 
Morocco. The table below suggests a characterization of countries in terms of potential to benefit 
from mobile phone banking, and to support viable mobile phone financial products. Market 
potential is influenced by the number of unbanked potential customers, wireless penetration 
rates, and relatively conducive regulatory frameworks that allow private sector activity and 
innovation. Egypt has the largest population in the Arab world, with very low financial access, 
but 65 percent of the population (55.4 million) already has a mobile phone. (Michaels, 2010)  
Mobile and agent-based financial services could also transform access to finance in Yemen. 
Nearly 70 percent of the population is living in rural areas which are without basic infrastructure. 
There are close to 8 million mobile phone subscribers in Yemen and less than 1 million bank 
accounts (CGAP, 2010). While West Bank and Gaza does not have a large population, the 
difficulties of moving cash in and out of Gaza may provide a business case for the introduction 
of mobile phone banking. In Iraq, mobile phone banking may help commercial banks overcome 
constraints of limited branch networks (state banks control the majority of branches) and 
uncertain security of movement.  
 
Table 6. Which MENA Countries have the Most Potential for Mobile Banking? 
LOW POTENTIAL  MEDIUM POTENTIAL  HIGH POTENTIAL 
Low rural or unbanked population 
Low mobile penetration 
Uncertain regulatory regimes 
High state ownership of bank and/or 
telecom assets (can limit innovation) 
High state ownership and control 
of banking and telecoms sectors 
Uncertain regulatory and 
business environments 
High rural populations 
Low levels of banked people 
High mobile penetration 
Increasingly conducive regulatory 
regimes 
Djibouti, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria  Algeria, Iraq  Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Yemen, 
Tunisia 
Source: Michaels, 2010.  Data presented in Annex  3.3. 
Mobile  phone  banking  in  MENA  has  not  yet  taken  off,  with  few  mobile  phone-based 
financial services yet launched. Regulators in high potential markets such as Egypt and Morocco 
are starting to ease regulatory constraints and allow banks to link with MNOs to launch financial 
services through mobile phones.  An emerging example of the use of technology in the MENA 
region is the use of electronic wallets (e-wallets), linked to cards and mobile phones, that can be 
used as a form of payment, to withdraw cash, to pay bills, recharge airtime, make deposits, and 
send  or  receive  money  transfers.  Emerging  mobile  phone  banking  examples  in  MENA  are 
outlined in the box below.  
 
 




Box 1. Mobile Phone Banking Products new to MENA 
 
Mobicash is now offered in Morocco by Maroc Telecom with Attijariwafa Bank and Banque Central 
Populaire.  In  late  2009,  Maroc  Telecom  (MT),  Morocco‟s  largest  mobile  operator  with  16  million 
subscribers and 61 per cent market share , along with Attijariwafa Bank and Banque Central Populaire, 
started implementation of Mobicash, Morocco‟s first mobile payments platform.  Over time, this service 
could introduce access to deposits, withdrawals, bill payments, money transfer and mobile banking, as 
well as international remittances.   
 
MTN Mobile Money in Yemen is offered by MTN with the Cooperative Agricultural Credit (CAC) Bank. 
CAC is one of the largest state-owned banks in Yemen, and already has a large portion of the bill 
payments business.  It also has its own POS acquiring network, the largest in the country.  The Mobile 
Money product is a mobile wallet, with customer funds kept in a pooled account at CAC.  The service 
will be accessed at CAC‟s 85 branches, 92 ATMs and 1,000 POS systems.   
 
M-dinar was launched in February 2010 by Banque International Arabe de Tunisie (BIAT), along with 
MNO Tunisiana and microfinance institution ENDA, and is a mobile wallet application.  Users need to 
open a BIAT account, and the service will allow for person to person transfers, top-up, loan payment 
services for MFI clients, and the ability to view account balances, transactions history and request cash 
from other users.  ENDA will also trial mandatory loan repayments via M-dinar to its 150,000 clients.  
 
In Iraq, AsiaCell announced in February 2010 that it would form a strategic partnership with a consortium 
of private banks, AMWAL, to provide money transfer and other services through mobile phones in Iraq. 
 
Sources: Akhtar & Pearce, 2010; Michaels, 2010; CGAP, 2010. 
 
Agents 
Retailers,  mobile  phone  airtime  providers,  and  other  non-financial  outlets,  offer  huge 
potential for expansion of access to finance, if they can be used as ‘agents’ for financial 
service delivery. Using banking agents and electronic payments to pay utility bills takes less 
time than traveling to and queuing in a range of utility offices, thereby bringing very tangible 
benefits. Similarly, collecting a pension, remittance receipt, and welfare or salary payment is a 
strong driver for opening accounts. Agents – such as retail stores or airtime sellers – are also key 
to the viability of mobile banking, as they are able to handle cash transactions. In Brazil, bill 
payments and the payments of government benefits to individuals comprised 78 percent of the 
1.53 billion transactions conducted at the country‟s more than 95,000 agents in 2006. (CGAP, 
2008).  Only  10  percent  of  MENA  countries  reported  allowing  banks  to  use  agents  in  2008 
however, which was well below other regions, for example 60 percent in ECA, 50 percent in 
high income countries, 41 percent in Latin America and the Caribbean, and 29 percent in sub-
Saharan Africa. In 2009 this improved though, with 3 countries reporting reforms to enable the 
use of agents. (CGAP and World Bank Financial Access 2009, 2010) The use of agents as a 
delivery mechanism is not yet widespread in the region however.   19 
 
Opening up the market for agents could lead to a 10 fold increase in access points for 
financial services in Yemen, according to a recent CGAP market assessment.  If small stores 
could  become  agents  for  financial  service  providers,  then  MTN  and  the  Cooperative  and 
Agricultural  Credit  (CAC)  Bank,  could  expand  their  reach  significantly.    CAC  is  already 
processing bill payments and money transfers through 150 „agent‟ outlets made up of kiosks and 
store locations. (CGAP, 2010)  If a common switch was also introduced, then a service by any 
one bank could be accessed through the entire POS and ATM network of the country.  
Government Policies and Programs, Regulation and Supervision 
Deficient financial infrastructure and inappropriate regulatory and supervisory frameworks have 
hindered financial inclusion in the MENA region, and have resulted in a financial sector that 
only serves a fraction of otherwise unmet financial service needs.  This section explores the 
policy, regulatory and supervisory framework for financial inclusion in MENA, including 
financial infrastructure. 
 
2.4  Regulation and Supervision  
Financial Inclusion constrained by Regulatory Framework 
Improved access to finance in MENA is constrained by inappropriate regulations, a lack of 
specialist supervisory capacity, and inadequate institutional models.  The majority of MFIs 
in the region are registered as NGOs, and are restricted from offering deposits in addition to 
loans (by regulators or by their own capacity limitations).  Many commercial and social investors 
are reluctant to finance NGOs or associations (or will only do so with short-term debt), or are not 
able to invest in shares.  Banks face interest rate caps in several countries that make microloans 
unattractive, and are in many cases restricted from using agents to extend financial services. 
Identity („know your customer‟) requirements are also relatively high in MENA, and can include 
requirements  that  are  not  appropriate  for  low  income  and  semi-formal  customers,  adding  a 
further set of costs and disincentives to banks to extend access. Technologies to improve access, 
such as point of sale devices and cellphone banking, are held back in MENA by restrictions on 
the role of agents  in  financial service delivery, and by extensive customer  ID requirements. 
MENA countries have the highest requirements in terms of documents (government ID, proof of 
address, legal status, proof of employment, etc) needed to open a deposit account.   
Microfinance legislation has been introduced, albeit on a limited scale, in two waves in the 
region, with the first more than a decade ago in Morocco and Tunisia, and the second more 
recently  in  countries  further  east,  such  as  Egypt,  Syria,  and  Yemen.    Government  reform 
priorities have been to ease financing constraints for enterprises, expand microsavings services, 
attract commercial financing into microfinance, and improve the transparency and strength of 
microfinance  institutions.  Morocco  and  Tunisia  first  introduced  microcredit–specific  laws  in 
1999  with  the  aim  of  establishing  a  new  microcredit  sector  serving  low  income  population 
segments. Several countries have also introduced institutional and legal reforms to extend access 20 
 
through post offices and state banks.  Table 7 illustrates the degree to which enabling regulatory 
frameworks have been introduced for financial inclusion in the MENA region. 
 
Table 7. Enabling Frameworks for Financial Inclusion 






By MFIs  By Post Office/ 
Post Bank 
By Credit  
Unions  
Algeria   -  -  -  -  Yes 
Egypt  Yes   Yes   -  Yes  - 
Iraq  -  -  -  -  - 
Jordan  -  Yes   -  Yes  - 
Lebanon  -  Yes  -  -  - 
Morocco  Yes  -  -  Yes  - 
Syria  Yes  Yes  Yes   -  - 
Tunisia  Yes  -  -  Yes  - 
West Bank & Gaza  Pending  -  -  -  Yes 
Yemen  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  - 
Sources: M Khaled 2010; Sanabel/CGAP/MIX, 2010 
 
Egypt has introduced regulations for non deposit-taking MFIs, while Syria and Yemen 
have  introduced  laws  permitting  the  establishment  of  deposit–taking  MFIs,  and  Jordan 
allowed MFIs to register as not-for-profit companies.  Egypt has approved a new Non-Bank 
Financial Institutions Licensing and Regulatory Bill, to be supervised by the Egyptian Financial 
Services Authority (EFSA), which will set the regulatory framework for microfinance, leasing, 
and  factoring  institutions,  as  well  as  standards  in  accounting,  transparency  and  corporate 
governance,  and lay  the foundation  for  a new  category  of non-bank microcredit companies. 
Allowing the creation of supervised microfinance companies can unlock potential investment, 
while  also  raising  standards  for  transparency  and  corporate  governance  for  microfinance 
institutions.  This regulatory reform does not allow for deposit services to low income persons, 
although Egypt Post does provide fairly extensive access to microsavings services.  
 
Social Financial Banking Institutions (SFBIs) have been allowed in Syria since 2007, with a 
minimum capital requirement of approximately USD 5 million. SFBIs are allowed to provide 
various  financial  services,  including  microlending,  deposit-taking  and  micro  insurance.    In 
Yemen  the  2009  Microfinance  Banks  Law  allows  these  „banks‟  to  mobilize  voluntary 
microsavings.  A microfinance supervisory unit is  being established.  However,  in  Syria and 
Yemen only a  few institutions  have applied for licenses, which may be related to  what  are 
reported to be lengthy registration and licensing procedures as well as lack of clear prudential 
guidelines. (Khaled, 2010) The business case of such deposit-taking MFIs is also unclear, as they 
would be competing with well-established postal savings networks. Other countries considering 
microfinance legislation to allow deposit-taking institutions include Iraq and Morocco. 
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In an increasing number of MENA countries a financial sector regulatory authority, such 
as a central bank or non-bank regulator, has supervisory responsibility for microfinance 
providers. However, in a number of countries there is no clear supervisory responsibility or 
framework, or the supervisor is a non-financial agency such as a Ministry of Social Affairs or 
Planning (see Annex A2.6 for detail by country). This makes the development of a sustainable, 
transparent and efficient microfinance sector that is able to intermediate deposits or borrowing 
less likely, and dependence on declining or unpredictable donor funding may continue. When 
compared to developing countries, MENA has a higher proportion of non-regulated institutions 
and a higher proportion of MFIs that fall under a non-financial regulator (table 8).  
 






All    
(%) 
Not regulated  50.0  37.9  47.7 
Supervised only by a bank regulator  30.0  42.7  35.4 
Supervised only by other regulator  20.0  7.8  7.7 
Supervised by both  0.0  11.7  9.2 
           
Number of countries  10  103  130 
Source: M Khaled, CGAP, 2010 
 
Interest Rate flexibility is constrained. Interest caps are in place in at least 6 MENA countries, 
whether or not they are actually enforced.
13 Most MENA countries use disclosure requirements 
(70  percent)  rather  than  usury  ceilings  in  practice,  to  try  and  ensure  that  interest  rates  are 
transparent and understood. Currently, most MFIs charge interest rates that are much higher than 
the interest rate caps, in order for micro-level products to be viable, and in so doing they run a 
risk of being challenged in court.  A more transparent approach would be to remove interest rate 
caps and instead strengthen consumer protection against abusive practices such as excessive fees 
on overdrafts, miss-selling of financial products and lack of consumer redress.  
 
Consumer Protection and Financial Inclusion 
Consumer protection and financial literacy are increasing priorities worldwide, as financial 
inclusion increases, with almost two thirds of middle income countries assigning responsibility 
for  these  areas  to  the  financial  regulator.    MENA  lags  other  regions  in  terms  of  assigning 
responsibility for consumer protection or financial literacy to a financial regulator. However a 
majority of MENA countries introduced consumer protection reforms in 2009. Of 11 MENA 
countries that responded to the CGAP and World Bank Financial Access survey in 2010 survey, 
7 had introduced consumer protection reforms, indicating that MENA is broadly in line with 
global trends in terms of increasing focus on consumer protection.    
 
                                                           
13 To date, however, there have been no known legal challenges to interest rates in this region. 22 
 
Figure 8. Consumer Protection and Financial Literacy under Responsibility of Financial 
Regulator 
 
Source: CGAP and World Bank Financial Access 2010 
 
Arab  microfinance  institutions  have  developed  consumer  protection  and  financial 
responsibility codes on a voluntary basis at a MENA regional level, and also in Jordan. MFI 
members  of  the  regional  microfinance  network,  Sanabel,  signed  a  consumer  protection  and 
responsible  finance  document  in  2008,  committing  themselves  to  standards  of  practice.  
Jordanian  MFIs  developed  and  signed  a  voluntary  Code  of  Ethics  covering  disclosure  and 
transparency, service standards, and ethical practices.  
2.5  Financial infrastructure  
Financial infrastructure underpins financial inclusion. Moral hazard and adverse selection 
are reduced as collateral frameworks and credit information systems are improved, and loans can 
be  made  -  at  a  lower  cost  and  risk  –  to  clients  that  previously  would  have  been  excluded.  
Without effective secured transactions laws and judicial (or non-judicial) processes, ideally with 
unified  collateral  registries  to  facilitate  lenders‟  use  of  collateral  as  a  guarantee,  micro 
entrepreneurs may not be able to leverage current assets into access to finance. Low income 
individuals and microenterprises also need access to low cost and safe payment mechanisms, 
whether for salaries, benefits, remittances, or for business transactions. 
 
MENA  has  the  lowest  score  on  the  Doing  Business  Legal  Rights  index  of  any  region, 
however.  As  a  result  banks  face  higher  costs  of  overcoming  information  asymmetries  and 
higher levels of credit and default risk for micro lending, and have not yet directly entered the 
low income consumer or microenterprise market at any great scale. The Legal Rights index 
assesses  the  use  of  movable  assets  as  collateral,  the  strength  of  creditor  rights,  and  the 
availability  of  out  of  court  enforcement  mechanisms  –  all  key  areas  for  improvement  for 
expanding financial inclusion. No MENA country scores above 4 out of 10 on this index.  Banks 
therefore do not extend lending further into the micro and small enterprise sector. Microfinance 
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expensive to register and may not be readily enforceable, and on outdated credit assessment and 
risk  management  techniques.  Low income customers  and microenterprise clients  face higher 
pricing  and  more  paperwork  and  delays,  and  many  otherwise  creditworthy  individuals  and 
entrepreneurs are excluded from access to finance.  
 
The  majority  of  banks  in  the  MENA  region  accept  movable  property  as  collateral. 
However, loans only secured with movable collateral are not widely used, due to the inability of 
banks to secure the right over the asset through a collateral registry and due to the difficulties in 
enforcing security interests in movable property. This is particularly acute for microloans where 
it may not make economic sense to execute collateral on a very small outstanding amount if the 
costs of doing so are relatively high. Movable property is usually accepted as a secondary type of 
collateral and usually taken as a complement to fixed assets (real estate property), which are also 
not well suited to microloans. Loans secured with assets such as receivables and inventory, are 
used even less often.  None of the MENA countries have a modern law on secured transactions.  
Intangible movable property, such as accounts receivables, bank accounts and salaries, is only 
allowed in a few MENA countries. (de la Campa, 2010) 
 
In  most  countries,  MFIs  have  not  been  integrated  into  the  formal  credit  information 
system, thus creating an information gap that could have direct consequences on the stability of 
the financial system. In some cases MFIs are prohibited by law from participating in the credit 
information  system.  In  others,  MFIs  are  reluctant  to  participate  due  to  the  high  cost  of  the 
system. The high value thresholds in some credit information systems also constitute a major 
challenge when compared to the low value of most microloans.  
 
The Moroccan central bank and the Palestinian Monetary Authority have taken a regional 
lead in requiring microfinance institutions to also upload lending and borrower data and to 
verify current debts of potential clients into their credit information system.  Arrangements to do 
so are under development in at least 5 MENA countries, but are not yet finalized, and ongoing 
delays  threaten  the  quality  and  sustainability  of  microfinance  sector  growth,  leaving  an 
information gap that could result in similar microfinance crises. MFIs can lack awareness of the 
benefits of participating in national credit bureaus, and their borrower records and reporting 
systems may not yet meet the reporting requirements of a credit bureau.   
 
Many Arab countries are undertaking payment system reforms, often supported by the Arab 
Payment Initiative (World Bank, Arab Monetary Fund, IMF).  Countries are working to improve 
the legal framework, payment system oversight, and introduce real time gross settlement systems 
(RTGS),  well-functioning  automated  clearing  houses  (ACH),  and  switching  systems  for 
connectivity between banks and card providers. The process in Egypt, as an example, is ongoing, 
with an RTGS and ACH established, and with full functionality being introduced in stages, for 




Box 2. Egypt: Financial Infrastructure Improvements pave the way for G2P-led Financial Inclusion 
 
Egypt is building on its improved payments systems infrastructure to move government payroll and 
pensions through debit cards, using the automated clearing house (ACH). As a result, 12 million monthly 
payments are expected to pass through the ACH within three years. Around 350,000 card-based accounts 
have already been opened under this new initiative, with eight banks participating.  The government also 
plans to conduct a major portion of tax and customs collections through the ACH, and even shift 
government vendors‟ payments through the ACH, using government certified digital signatures and the 
treasury single account.  
 
The government makes 30,000-40,000 procurement-related transactions daily, mostly through checks sent 
to microenterprises and SMEs (for example small tradespersons).  These will increasingly instead be 
made through ATMs and banks accounts.  The „billers hub‟ that is currently used for bill payment to 
mobile phone providers, could also be extended to cover payments to government (thus making use of 
mobile phones), and payment of credit card bills using direct debit arrangements.   
 
Further, a national inter-bank switch system for ATM, Electric Funds Transfer-Point of Sale and inter-
bank mobile transactions has been established to support retail payments, and will be extended to cover 
the remaining four banks not yet included, and to handle local transactions in Egypt rather than abroad. 
Payment systems regulations would be issued to cover licensing of payment service providers and the 
oversight of payment services and systems. 
 
2.6  Government Policy and Programs 
Financial inclusion is not yet a priority for financial regulators in most MENA countries. 
Financial  regulators  in  MENA  have  the  second  lowest  degree  of  involvement  in  promoting 
financial inclusion, ahead only of high income countries where financial exclusion is at much 
lower levels (figure 9). Almost half of all the countries covered by the CGAP and World Bank 
Financial  Access  2010  report  (48  percent)  have  a  strategy  document  for  the  promotion  of 
financial inclusion, with 90 percent of those introduced within the last 6 years.  
 
Figure 9. Index of Regulator’s involvement in Financial Inclusion
 
                               Source: CGAP and World Bank Financial Access 2010 
0.34  0.39  0.39  0.43 






















Individual MENA governments have introduced reforms and new initiatives to promote 
financial inclusion. „Financially inclusive‟ bank accounts have been introduced by five MENA 
countries (Iran, Kuwait, Egypt, Morocco, Oman), two of those in 2009.  Over a third of MENA 
regulators are trying to shift more government-to-person transfers through bank accounts, with 
five  countries  having  made  reforms  in  2009  to  accelerate  this.  Only  three  countries  have 
introduced reforms to enable branchless banking through agent networks. Four out the eleven 
MENA  countries  reporting  to  the  CGAP  and  World  Bank  Financial  Access  Survey  (2010) 
reported official household or enterprise surveys that include a focus on access to finance.  Tax 
incentive schemes to stimulate savings are not widely used. 
 
The Moroccan government has prioritized access alongside stability in its ongoing program 
of  financial  reforms,  and  has  introduced  measures  to  extend  access  through  microcredit 
associations, banks, and a new postal bank.  In 2008 banks were invited to develop financial 
inclusion strategies, and the central bank more recently has signaled to banks that it is open to 
allowing  innovations  in  products  and  delivery  mechanisms.  The  Central  Bank  of  Egypt  has 
launched  a  multi-pronged  financial  inclusion  agenda,  including  a  Pensions  and  Payments 
Initiative  to  extend  access  to  basic  bank  accounts  by  providing  pensions,  salaries  and 
procurement payments through the financial system, and a new Licensing and Regulation Law to 
stimulate the creation of microfinance, leasing, and factoring companies. The Jordanian, Syrian, 
Tunisian, Palestinian, Lebanese and Iranian governments, among others, have also implemented 
notable financial inclusion policies and programs outlined elsewhere in this paper.   
 
State banks and post offices can have extensive branch networks for extending access to 
financial services. One of the largest branch networks in the region is that of the Principal Bank 
for Development and Agricultural Credit (PDBAC), the state agricultural bank in Egypt.  An 
initial  phase  of  reforms  is  showing  promising  results  in  terms  of  improved  institutional 
performance and financials, with an experienced and successful banker as its manager, and non-
bank activities (such as agricultural inputs supply) separated from commercial banking.  The 
second phase, with technical assistance from Rabobank, is to better utilize its network of service 
outlets through improved inter-branch connectivity, product diversification, and investment in 
improved  systems.  The  PBDAC  example  is  also  notable  as  it  represents  a  more  strategic 
approach of extending financial inclusion through reforms that aim to turnaround institutional 
performance and improve branch viability, instead of the easier short-term option of closing 
branches and reducing access. 
The creation of a new postal bank in Morocco, building on the strengths of the Post Office as 
often the only institution serving the low income population - including the rural population, 
self-employed, and those with irregular incomes – is a promising example of the approach of 
creating a postal bank.  
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Box 3. Morocco: new Postal Bank to expand access 
The Government is creating a new Postal Bank building on the existing strengths of the Post Office. The 
post office already provides some basic services (savings passbooks and checking accounts) to a large 
customer base (4.3 million people).  
The new Postal Bank is expected to play a significant access role, by offering a wider range of banking 
services to underserved categories of the population. The Postal Bank, a subsidiary of the Post Office, 
will target individuals with a monthly income below 3,000 MAD (357 USD) with an objective of 5.4 
million clients by 2015 (a 26 percent increase compared to 2009).  These customers are not yet targeted 
by commercial banks. New services (transfers, payments, debit cards, overdrafts, mortgage loans) will be 
introduced, although lending would not be offered until a later stage when institutional capacity is more 
developed.  
The Central Bank granted the license to the new Postal Bank in July 2009.  As the new institution 
ventures into new territories, risk management and internal controls will need to be strengthened.  In 
recent years, the Post Office has improved its financial operations with the assistance of consultants (IT 
systems,  branches,  back  offices,  audit),  including  improvements  in  internal  controls  required  by  the 
Central Bank during the two year licensing process. The separation of postal and financial activities 
should improve the quality of services, while outreach should be improved with the specialization of 
branches and staff, as well as the opening of new branches (550 new branches by 2018) and distribution 
channels (100 mobile branches and 50 cash points by 2018). The Postal Bank will be subject to the 
supervision of the Central Bank, like other public commercial banks.   
 
 
Yemen  offers  an  example  of  using  technology  to  extend  access  through  a  post  office 
network. The Yemen Post Office and Yemen Mobile may launch a mobile banking service, 
extending access through and beyond the current 300 post office locations. The Yemen Post 
Office provides savings to 403,000 clients and current accounts to 85,000, and has a significant 
volume of transfers that would underpin the viability of a mobile banking service, including 
domestic money transfers, government salary disbursements, retiree pensions, and social welfare 
fund payments. (CGAP, 2010) 
 
3.  Recommendations: a Roadmap for Financial Inclusion in MENA  
Financial  inclusion  is  an  increasing  priority  for  Governments  around  the  world.  The 
„roadmap‟ of measures outlined here would i) stimulate private sector investment in serving low 
income individuals and microenterprises, ii) remove policy, infrastructure and legal barriers to 
financial service providers to sustainably and prudently expand access to financial services, and 
iii) encourage product diversification and improved risk management.  
The G20 has developed a set of nine Principles for Innovative Financial Inclusion, through a 
Financial Inclusion Experts Group, which will “form the basis of a concrete and pragmatic action 
plan  for  improving  access  to  financial  services  amongst  the  poor”.    These  principles  were 
endorsed by the G20 Leadership Summit in Toronto in June 2010, and an action plan will be 
released at the Seoul Summit in November 2010. The Principles are outlined in Annex 4. The 
Financial Inclusion priorities outlined in this section are fully consistent with these Principles.   27 
 
1.  Financial Inclusion Strategy backed by data, resources and commitment 
Governments and regulators need to take the lead in supporting improvements in access to 
finance, including in access to microfinance, displaying the Leadership called for in the G20 
Principles.  Financial regulators and governments can add financial inclusion as a goal alongside 
prudential regulation and financial system stability, and develop financial inclusion strategies.  
The CGAP and World Bank Financial Access survey (2010) of financial regulators worldwide 
found that regions that include financial access in their strategies and mandate their financial 
regulators to carry such agendas are also the countries that reform the most. Regulators with a 
financial inclusion strategy are more likely to have more financial inclusion topics under their 
purview  and  more  resources  and  staff  dedicated  to  working  on  these  matters.  
 
Figure 10. Countries with a Financial Inclusion Strategy Document 
 
Source: CGAP and World Bank Financial Access 2010 
 
Agree Charters and Targets with the Private Sector 
 
Financial  inclusion  can  be  promoted  through  shared  public  and  private  sector  goals, 
developed on the basis of improved market data on financial exclusion.  Cooperation with 
the  private  sector  and  civil  society  (a  G20  Principle)  is  essential  to  achieve  far-reaching 
improvements in financial inclusion.  Private sector commitments, which may be backed by a 
threat of regulation or enforcement if the private sector is not sufficiently active in delivering 
them, can be an effective means of promoting financial inclusion and financial capability. Banks 
and  MFIs  can  then  take  a  leading  role  in  promoting  financial  inclusion,  spurred  on  by 
competition,  the threat  of regulation,  and monitoring, and in  line with market  opportunities.  
Commitments by regulators and governments can complement private sector targets. 
 
Charters  or  codes  of  practice  can  be  used  to  agree  and  set  out  the  financial  sector‟s 
commitments to expanding access to financial services and to improving the terms of that access. 
Codes and charters can also encompass consumer education, transparency of information on 
products, services and tariff structures, complaint handling, and providing secure and reliable 
banking  and  payment  systems;  backed  up  by  regulations  and  enforcement  where  necessary.  
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Table  9  synthesizes  the  key  components  of  what  has  been  effective  in  several  countries.   
 
Table 9: Financial Inclusion Approach and Examples 
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Source: Pearce & Bajaj, 2006.   
Data availability 
Improved  data  on  financial  inclusion  and  unbanked  markets/customers  is  needed  to 
underpin a sustainable expansion in access to finance, as emphasized by the G20 Principle for 
Financial Inclusion, Knowledge.  Household and enterprise-level survey questions can provide 
governments and regulators with the data they need for designing reforms and then monitoring 
the effectiveness of those reform measures.  Financial service providers need market data on 
financial service demand and needs for new market segments that they have not had previous 
involvement in, in order to design appropriate financial products and delivery mechanisms.  In 
addition to financial regulator monitoring of progress on financial inclusion, government support 
may be needed in generating market data for financial service providers, at least initially to 
address this market failure. 
Use Government Payments as a Stimulus for Financial Inclusion 
An  area  that  the  Government  has  direct  control  over  is  how  it  pays  benefits  (social 
transfers  and  pension  payments)  and  salaries.  By  shifting  government  payments  to 
individuals (G2P, or „Government to Person‟) from payments in cash disbursed from post offices 
or bank tellers, to bank accounts and smart cards (or even mobile phones), significant advances 
in financial inclusion can be made. Governments make regular payments to at least 170 million 
poor people worldwide.  Yet in most countries, fewer than one-quarter of G2P payments to the 29 
 
poor  land  in  an  account  that  is  accessible,  in  terms  of  cost  and  distance.  (Porteous,  2006) 
Delivering  G2P  payments  electronically  implies  creating  for  each  recipient  a  store-of-value 
account where funds can be held for some period, and connecting that account to an electronic 
payment system. With these elements in place, it becomes possible to expand the account into a 
financially inclusive one that the recipient can use to save and to transact outgoing as well as 
incoming payments.  
Promote Financially Inclusive Bank Accounts  
MENA governments can encourage banks to launch financially inclusive accounts, shifting G2P 
payments (increased transaction volume) through such accounts to enhance their viability.  Five 
MENA countries are already promoting financially inclusive bank accounts (according to central 
bank reporting to CGAP), and five are actively shifting Government payments (salaries, benefits) 
into the financial system, although only three countries are implementing both – highly inter-
related – approaches in parallel.  Financial inclusive accounts for low income customers offer 
basic  services  such  as  payments,  deposits,  and  in  some  cases  debit  cards,  in  order  to  bring 
unbanked people into the banking system and build a financial history. Encouragement may also 
be needed by Government through shared financial inclusion targets,  and even the threat of 
regulation if needed, for banks to offer these accounts, as they can be less profitable than full 
service accounts for higher income customers. 
Extend access to a broader range of financial services through existing branch networks 
State banks and post offices can offer a unique network of existing outlets as a delivery 
mechanism for financial services. Postal networks can be restricted to only offering payment 
and  perhaps  deposit  services  though,  while  access  to  state  banks  can  be  complicated  by 
eligibility criteria, paperwork, inappropriate governance structures, and inefficiencies. Making 
use of these networks to extend low cost access to a more diverse range of financial services can 
involve i) institutional reform of a state bank, introducing new financial services and improving 
governance, portfolio quality, systems and efficiency, ii) the creation of a postal bank, often 
through a dedicated law, or iii) arrangements with specialized financial service providers, such as 
banks or MFIs, to provide financial services through the network of outlets. 
2.  Provide  a  Regulatory  and  Supervisory  Framework  that  supports  wide  Financial 
Inclusion based on sound risk management and with sufficient consumer protections.  
Governments  should  consider  i)  allowing  banks  to  expand  access  through  agents,  and 
through  use  of  technology  (including  mobile  phones),  ii)  providing  a  finance  company 
model for microcredit and leasing, and iii) removing interest rate caps for microcredit, and 
instead strengthening consumer protection and stimulating competition between financial service 
providers.    A  regulatory  and  supervisory  framework  for  deposit-taking  MFIs  such  as 
microfinance banks may not be justified, as these institutions require relatively large up-front 30 
 
investments and can have limited branch networks. Full service commercial and state banks, as 
well as postal banks and post offices, are better placed to offer deposit services through existing 
systems and infrastructure – potentially through financial inclusive accounts - without the need 
for a new institutional framework such as a deposit-taking MFI. 
Stronger,  well  performing  microcredit  NGOs  should  have  the  option  of  graduating  to 
regulated financial institutions, such as a finance company model.  A finance company legal 
form  can  provide  the  necessary  clarity  for  banks  and  investors  on  key  questions  such  as 
governance, ownership, tax liabilities, and capital base of MFIs, which an NGO license may not. 
Where  regulatory  frameworks  have  been  put  in  place  in  MENA  that  allow  specialized 
microfinance institutions – such as finance companies - regulated by financial regulators, the 
institutions set-up under those frameworks are out-performing microcredit NGOs in terms of 
growth, and are now a leading driver of growth in MENA microfinance. (Sanabel 2010)  A 
finance  company  model  can  tap  more  effectively  into  commercial  bank  and  microfinance 
investor sources of finance – both equity and debt – and potentially do so on more favorable 
terms (lower cost, less collateral required, longer tenors, currency), than an NGO or association 
model. 
Branchless Banking  
For branchless banking innovations to meet their potential to reduce costs and expand 
outreach, enabling legislation for the use of electronic payments, electronic money, and agents, 
is needed. Adequate payments infrastructure is also required, and ideally a common switching 
mechanism.  The extent to which mobile banking will be transformational in a country will 
depend in large measure on whether there is a sufficient degree of openness  (there is opportunity 
to start-up and experiment) and certainty (investors can be confident there will not be arbitrary or 
negative changes) to the legal and regulatory framework.   
 
Box 4: Principles for an Enabling Environment for Mobile Phone Banking 
 
First tier principles: these are necessary for mobile phone banking to happen at scale: 
1. There should be sufficient certainty around electronic contracting. 
2. Customers should be adequately protected against fraud and abuse in the mobile banking environment. 
3. Inter-operability should be encouraged, through ensuring that providers can access payment platforms 
and that consumers are able to switch financial providers. 
 
Second tier principles: for transformational models to emerge and succeed, the following additional principles are 
also necessary: 
4. Customer due diligence procedures for account opening should be risk-based, and should not unduly 
prejudice remote account openings by small customers. 
5. Customers should be able at least to make deposits and withdraw cash through agents and remote points 
outside of bank branches. 
6. Adequate provision must be made for the issuance of electronic money by appropriately capitalized and 
supervised entities which are not necessarily banks. 
 
Source: Porteous, 2006 
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In  countries  where  mobile  banking  has  taken  off,  such  as  Kenya,  the  Philippines,  and 
Brazil,  common  characteristics  of  the  interactions  between  regulators  and  service 
providers have been: 
-  Willingness to consider non-traditional approaches, observe their performance and 
adjust rules as necessary,  
-  Continuous dialogue between service providers and regulators,  
-  Flexible,  proportionate  approaches  to  KYC/AML  rules  via  transaction  &  balance 
limits, based on understanding of actual risks, and  
-  Regulator  monitoring  and  reporting  mechanisms  to  keep  authorities  informed. 
(Michaels, 2010) 
 
In  countries  where  mobile  banking  products  have  been  allowed  to  emerge,  financial 
regulators have tended to focus on whether consumers are making “deposits” when they hand a 
service provider their money, how to protect consumers, and Anti-Money Laundering rules (in 
particular Know Your Customer requirements).  The training, performance and liability of agents 
(for  example  retailers  or  airtime  sellers)  are  a  particular  concern  to  many  regulators  in  this 
regard.  There is also a growing regulator focus on competition, shared infrastructure and/or 
interoperability, and new business models involving different players.   
 
Use of Agents  
A regulatory structure is needed that allows banks to link with MFIs, telecoms providers, 
and other non-financial actors. Banks and other financial service providers, such as insurance 
companies, can provide services through agents through wholesale financing, service delivery 
agreements, fee-based services, agent agreements, and other arrangements. Rules on the use of 
non-bank retail outlets as agents are needed, that allow outlets (agents) to perform cash-in/cash-
out  and  other  customer  interface  functions.  The  recent  CGAP-led  assessment  of  branchless 
banking  options  in  Yemen  recommended  the  following  enabling  framework  for  branchless 
banking through agents (Box 5):  
Box 5. Enabling Framework recommendations for Agents, the case of Yemen 
 
1.  Any legal entity, including MFIs, post office, retail stores, MNO outlets, exchange companies, may 
be hired by a central bank-licensed institution as an agent to deliver limited financial services 
2.  Agents may provide most banking services, including bill payments, transfers, deposits, withdrawals, 
disbursement or repayment of loans, and national wires.  
3.  The financial institution should remain fully liable for services provided through agents 
4.  Agents and banks would need to pre-agree customer fees, and communicate those to customers 
5.  Agents may offer services on behalf of multiple banks, as long as the agent has a separate agreement 
with each bank. 
6.  Agents could also be required to implement „know your customer‟ requirements, although potentially 
with lower level requirements for low volume transactions.  
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Strengthen Consumer Protection  
Consumer protection is increasingly important as access increases, so that new customers, 
and existing customers with access to new services, can take well informed decisions about how 
best to manage and use financial services. New providers and delivery mechanisms also open up 
scope for consumer fraud and abuse, as well as to unintentional errors. The G20 Principles call 
for „clear and transparent consumer protection regulations that require transparency in pricing 
and services; identify the parties ultimately responsible for upholding the protections; define 
supervisory authority; and ensure effective means of dispute resolution and redress are in place.‟  
Consumer laws and regulations are needed: i) to protect against unfair or deceptive practices, 
including in advertising and selling financial products, and collecting loan repayments, ii) to 
improve  transparency  through  disclosure  and  plain  language  requirements  for  products  and 
pricing,  in  a  way  that  allows  consumers  to  easily  compare  offers  of  financial  products  (for 
example publication of comparable loan or remittance transfer rates), and iii) to establish a low 
cost, efficient, and fair mechanism for resolving customer complaints and disputes. (CGAP and 
World Bank Financial Access 2010)  A dedicated agency, or unit within the financial regulator, 
is needed to ensure a well coordinated and effective approach.  Disclosure and redress are at the 
center  of  consumer  protection,  as  a  primary  objective  of  consumer  protection  in  financial 
services  is  to  compensate  for  the  imbalance  of  information,  power  and  resources  between 
consumers and financial institutions. (S Rutledge, pers. comm.)  
3. Strengthen Financial Infrastructure for Financial Inclusion  
Financial infrastructure improvements reduce the information asymmetry that constrains 
access to credit and raises the costs and risk of financial intermediation.  Reforming secured 
transactions  laws  and  collateral  registries  can  make  the  use  of  collateral  more  feasible, 
particularly the kind of lower value movable collateral that is more suited to microenterprise 
loans.  Improving  credit  information  sharing  systems,  and  including  microfinance  providers, 
enables microfinance providers to make use of more efficient credit scoring technologies that 
allow them to lower costs, risks, and loan pricing.  
Regulated financial entities should be required to share credit information, ideally through 
national  credit  bureaus  rather  than  only  through  narrow  microfinance  information-sharing  
systems. Sharing borrower information is key to lowering costs and overcoming information 
constraints. By integrating microfinance borrower information into credit bureaus, the coverage 
and utility of data in the credit bureaus can be improved.  Financial institutions of all types can 
extend access to new customers, while managing risks and costs more effectively.   Government 
intervention  or  encouragement  may  be  needed  to  ensure  that  pricing  by  monopolistic  credit 
bureaus is accessible for microfinance institutions. Lower pricing for loans below a certain size, 
may be needed to avoid passing on disproportionately high costs to borrowers. The Moroccan 33 
 
central bank included differential (lower) pricing for microloans as a condition of awarding the 
contract for management of new credit bureaus.  
 
4. Ensure a level playing field for Islamic Microfinance  
 
An  innovation  that  is  directly  linked  to  financial  inclusion  is  the  introduction  and 
adaptation of Islamic banking products for low income consumers and microenterprises.  
A  lack  of  Shariah-compliant  financial  services  is  a  constraint  on  financial  inclusion  to  a 
proportion of the population. The growth of Islamic microfinance will depend to a large degree 
on  whether  financial  institutions  can  develop  sufficiently  attractive  financial  products  and 
services, which are competitive with conventional products in terms of pricing, transparency, 
processing time, and burden on the client. This will be determined in part by their capacity and 
systems, but regulators can also provide a more level playing field for Islamic microfinance. This 
extends beyond financial sector regulation to the tax code, as Islamic financing that involves 
additional transactions such as passing on a property title, has tax implications such as capital 
gains tax, which are not present in conventional deals.  
 
Practical measures that can be taken by regulators (as has been the case in Indonesia and 
Pakistan) include: licensing Islamic banks, supporting centers for training and certification on 
Islamic financial operations to staff and managers of financial service providers, and developing 
guidelines setting out requirements for licensing and appointment of Sharia advisers to rule on 
Sharia compliance. The political climate for Islamic finance  also affects investor and lender 
decisions  about  whether  to  offer  Shariah-compliant  products,  and  acts  as  an  incentive  or 
disincentive to its growth.     34 
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ANNEX 1. Access to Finance in MENA: Headline Indicators 
 
A1.1 Access Indicators for Selected MENA Countries 
Country 
Bank Deposit Accounts 
per 1000 adults 
Bank Loan Accounts 
per 1000 adults 
Private Credit 
as % GDP 
Yemen  103.9  8.3  7.2 
Syrian Arab Republic  191.5  72.9  15.7 
Morocco  265.3  -  78.4 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  439.4  84.9  43.6 
Algeria  736.6  -  12.6 
Jordan  898.8  200.6  88.8 
Oman  1,042.6  412.8  39.4 
Tunisia  639.7  193.5  63.2 
Lebanon  1,372.0  519.9  73.5 
United Arab Emirates  1,750.6  -  73.8 
Kuwait  -  -  60.1 
Source: CGAP and World Bank Financial Access 2010, International Financial Statistics. Iran data for 2008. 
 



















Yemen  1.8  0.4  2.8  0.7  17.0  4.1 
Syria  2.4  1.8  2.7  2.0  2.2  1.7 
Algeria  5.3  0.6  5.7  0.6  -  - 
Egypt  8  4.5  8.7  4.9  -  - 
Saudi Arabia  8.5  0.7  54.4  4.5  438.5  36.3 
Morocco  9.9  4.9  18.6  9.3  89.9  44.8 
Tunisia  14.4  7.3  17.3  8.8  121.6  61.7 
Kuwait  16.5  19.3  53.4  62.6  1,040.1  1,219.4 
Jordan  17.8  7.7  26.3  11.4  -  - 
UAE  20.9  9.0  99.3  43.1  -  - 
Oman  22.6  1.4  45.9  2.8  -  - 
Lebanon  28.8  86.5  39.3  118.0  1,382.8  4,149.1 
Iran  29.2  9.7  29.8  9.9  2,038.1  680.4 
Source: CGAP and World Bank Financial Access 2010, Egypt Central Bank, Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
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A1.3 Financial Inclusion: Provider Typology 


















Algeria  2008  -  No data  4  3
14  1  29 
Bahrain  2009  -  -  -  3  -  3 
Egypt  2010  4  -  -  >280 (14)  -  - 
Iraq  2010  -  -  -  13 (2)  - 
 
Iran  2009  -  No data  5  -  -  18 
Jordan  2009  1  0  3 
200 SHGs,  
7 MFIs (7)  -  3 
KSA  2010  -  -  -  1  -  - 
Kuwait  2008  -  112  1  -  99  227 
Lebanon  2009  >3  0  -  (3)  -  53 
Morocco  2009  -  11  5  13 (9)  43  84 
Oman  2008  -  0  2  0  6  25 
Syria  2009  -  0  1  2 (2)  0  21 
Tunisia  2009  -  0  1  273 (1)  15  309 
WB&G  -  -  -  -  (8)  -  - 
Yemen  2009  1  0  2  13  (6)  1  29 
Source: Survey on access to financial services CGAP. Figures in parentheses are the number of MFIs reporting to the Microfinance Information 
Exchange.  (*) All MFIs except for those in Syria and Yemen are not deposit-taking.  SHGs are „self help groups‟.  
 
A1.4 Regression Analysis: Deposit Accounts 
VARIABLES
15  (1) Dep. Acc  (2) Dep. Acc  (3) Dep. Acc 
GDP per capita  0.0171**  0.00644  0.0822* 
 
[-0.00662]  [0.007]  [0.0365] 
Branches per 100,000 adults  38.06***  73.21***  69.84* 
 
[-9.727]  [-16.93]  [-24.56] 




   
[-434] 
  ATM per 100,000 adults 
   
-37.8 
     
[-20.95] 
Constant  144.2  -628.8  26.03 
 
[-135.7]  [-353.2]  [-135] 
Observations  10  9  10 
R-squared  0.852  0.943  0.904 
Standard errors in brackets.  *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
                                                           
14 The Agence de Developpement Social (ADS) provides microloans through banks.  There are no MFIs of any notable scale. 
15 Source of country data used in the regressions: CGAP and World Bank Financial Access 2010 
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ANNEX 2. Principal Features of Microcredit in MENA 
 




2006  2007  2008  2009 
Growth Rate 
08-09 
Bahrain  2,175  2,175  2,175  2,175  0% 
Saudi Arabia  7,000  7,012  7,064  7,064  0% 
Syria  50,611  54,620  22,660  26,118  15% 
WB/G  25,592  23,313  31,633  36,532  15% 
Lebanon  16,109  21,284  27,759  38,036  37% 
Yemen  33,934  34,062  34,982  41,268  18% 
Iraq  15,234  24,597  38,084  55,266  45% 
Jordan  77,778  110,202  139,715  161,154  15% 
Tunisia  123,504  146,308  177,124  205,206  16% 
Morocco  996,482  1,334,147  1,256,084  923,551  -26% 
Egypt  751,529  1,093,539  1,148,621  1,310,746  14% 
MENA   2,099,948  2,851,259  2,885,901  2,807,116  -3% 
Source: Sanabel Microfinance Regional Network 2010, Microfinance Information Exchange 
 
A2.2 Market Trends: Growth in Outstanding Loan Portfolio 
Country 
Gross Loans  Growth Rates (%) 
2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Morocco  163,683,452  422,546,383  722,756,147  699,063,213  612,432,772  158.1  71  -3.3  -12.4 
Saudi Arabia     5,866,041  6,190,234  7,870,346  7,862,514     5.5  27.1  -0.1 
Bahrain  775,193  775,193  775,193  775,193  775,193  0  0  0  0 
Jordan  65,848,733  83,431,699  87,338,912  128,060,962  133,934,944  26.7  4.7  46.6  4.6 
Tunisia  78,262,116  83,614,008  93,436,674  105,012,790  112,407,271  6.8  11.7  12.4  7 
Syria  65,556,153  68,151,129  71,271,600  17,917,603  19,871,075  4  4.6  -74.9  10.9 
Egypt  190,335,538  245,407,712  271,471,809  328,145,693  372,735,191  28.9  10.6  20.9  13.6 
Palestine  36,414,494  40,040,235  53,440,074  80,188,384  97,657,312  10  33.5  50.1  21.8 
Lebanon  38,486,265  37,974,542  44,460,215  50,088,416  61,538,963  -1.3  17.1  12.7  22.9 
Yemen  4,747,602  5,747,540  4,423,347  6,031,871  7,873,736  21.1  -23  36.4  30.5 
Iraq  18,602,228  64,867,831  32,232,442  55,145,177  78,325,160  248.7  -50.3  71.1  42 
MENA  662,711,774  1,058,422,313  1,387,796,647  1,478,299,648  1,505,414,131  59.7  31.1  6.5  1.8 
Source: Sanabel 
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A2.3 MENA Microfinance Sector: Headline Ratios 
Country  Profitability (ROA) 
Operating Expense/  
Loan Portfolio 
Portfolio Quality  
(PAR>30 days) 
Syria  -2.0  4.5%  3.3% 
Morocco  0.3  23.6%  4.8% 
Yemen  0.7  43.6%  4% 
Jordan  5.4  24.9%  2.1% 
Lebanon  5.6  18.3%  2.1% 
Palestine  5.7  26.9%  11.3% 
Egypt  6.5  20%  1.8% 
Tunisia  9.0  17.2%  0.5% 
Iraq  20.6  15.4%  0% 
Source: MIX database. 2008 data.  Profitability ROA (weighted averages). Portfolio Quality (weighted averages by gross loans) 
 
 
A2.4        Borrowers by Country (2009)           Loan Portfolio Market Share 
(2009) 
 
Source: Sanabel Industry Survey, 2009 (Microfinance in the Arab Region: An Industry Update) 
 
A2.5 Funding for Microfinance in MENA: Sources of Funding by Lender Type 
1  Number of MFIs  Total Amount (USD)  Percentage 
Development Finance Institution  14  17,019,493  2.6 
Financial Institution  24  522,479,127  80.2 
Fund  14  29,073,806  4.5 
Government  12  69,624,889  10.7 
Other  13  13,216,559  2 
Source: MIX database 
























































Fall under non-financial 
regulator 
Algeria  X    -  3  X  
Egypt  -  X   2 
MFI NGOs still overseen by  
Ministry of Social Solidarity 
Iraq  X  -  - 
X 
(Ministry of Trade, 
NGO Assistance Office) 
Jordan  X    -  - 
 X  
(Ministries of Industry and Trade, 
Planning, Social Development) 
Kuwait  X    -  0  -  
Lebanon  X    -  0   - 
Morocco     X   -  -  
Oman  X      0   - 
Syrian Arab Republic     X   1    - 
Tunisia  X   -  -   X 
UAE  X  -  0  - 
Yemen, Rep.  X    X   14  Most MFIs report to  
Social Fund for Development  
Source: M Khaled, 2010; MIX, Sanabel, CGAP, 2010.  Iran also has MFIs regulated by a financial regulator.  
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ANNEX 3. Branchless Banking 
 
A3.1 ATM Networks 
 
Source: CGAP and World Bank Financial Access 2010 
 
 
A3.2 Point of Sale Networks 
 
Source: CGAP and World Bank Financial Access 2010 
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A3.3 Mobile Penetration, GDP per capita in MENA 
Country  Total Population 
Rural population 
(% of total 
population) 




(per 100 people) 
Djibouti  849,245  12.7  1,030  13.3 
Yemen, Rep.  22,917,485  69.4  1,160  16.1 
West Bank and Gaza  3,937,309  28.1  1,123  29.3 
Lebanon  4,193,758  13.0  6,978  34.0 
Syrian Arab Republic  20,581,290  45.8  2,682  34.3 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  81,527,172  57.3  1,991  50.6 
Iraq  30,711,152  33.4 
 
57.1 
Iran, Islamic Rep.  71,956,322  31.5  4,028  59.8 
Morocco  31,605,616  44.0  2,769  72.2 
Libya  6,294,181  22.5  14,802  76.7 
Tunisia  10,327,800  33.5  3,903  83.3 
Jordan  5,906,043  21.6  3,596  90.0 
Algeria  34,373,426  34.8  4,845  92.7 
Kuwait  2,728,041  1.6  54,260  106.6 
Oman  2,785,361  28.4  15,273  115.6 
Qatar  1,280,862  4.4  62,451  131.4 
Saudi Arabia  24,645,686  17.6  19,022  146.1 
Bahrain  775,585  11.5  28,240  185.8 
United Arab Emirates  4,484,935  22.1  45,531  208.6 
Source: WDI World Bank 2008 data 
 
A3.4 Comparison of Service Prices Between Banks and Branchless Banking Providers 
  Bank  Branchless Banking (BB) 
Provider 
% by which BB is 
Cheaper 
Sending  2.8  2.4  12% 
Receiving  2.8  2.1  24% 
Short-term Safekeeping  3.7  5.4  -48% 
Medium-term Savings  3.3  1.6  50% 
Bill Payments  6.9  3.4  50% 
High Usage  8.4  7.4  12% 
M-Pesa Customer  3.3  2.9  12% 
Kenya Bank Customer  7.5  6.5  14% 
AVERAGE  4.8  3.9  19% 
Total Price to send & 
receive $62 ($160 PPP) 
Avg Informal 
Provider**: $10.7 
Avg Branchless Banking 
Provider: $4.9 
54% 
Source: CGAP, Branchless Banking Pricing Analysis, Claudia McKay, Mark Pickens, May 2010; 2010 data 
Note: * Prices based on one month of usage.  Figures in US$ PPP adjusted. ** Informal methods analyzed include taxi/courier, money changer, 
bus service, and post office in 3 countries. 
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ANNEX 4. G20 Principles for Innovative Financial Inclusion 
 
Innovative financial inclusion means improving access to financial services for poor people through the 
safe and sound spread of new approaches. The following principles aim to help create an enabling policy 
and regulatory environment for innovative financial inclusion. The enabling environment will critically 
determine the speed at which the financial services access gap will close for the more than two billion 
people currently excluded. These principles for innovative financial inclusion derive from the experiences 
and  lessons  learned  from  policymakers  throughout  the  world,  especially  leaders  from  developing 
countries. 
 
1.  Leadership:  Cultivate  a  broad-based  government  commitment  to  financial  inclusion  to  help 
alleviate poverty. 
2.  Diversity:  Implement  policy  approaches  that  promote  competition  and  provide  market-based 
incentives for delivery of sustainable financial access and usage of a broad range of affordable 
services (savings, credit, payments and transfers, insurance) as well as a diversity of service 
providers.   
3.  Innovation: Promote technological and institutional innovation as a means to expand financial 
system access and usage, including by addressing infrastructure weaknesses.   
4.  Protection: Encourage a comprehensive approach to consumer protection that recognizes the 
roles of government, providers and consumers.    
5.  Empowerment: Develop financial literacy and financial capability.   
6.  Cooperation:  Create  an  institutional  environment  with  clear  lines  of  accountability  and  co-
ordination within government; and also encourage partnerships and direct consultation across 
government, business and other stakeholders.   
7.  Knowledge:  Utilize  improved  data  to  make  evidence  based  policy,  measure  progress,  and 
consider  an  incremental  “test  and  learn”  approach  acceptable  to  both  regulator  and  service 
provider.   
8.  Proportionality: Build a policy and regulatory framework that is proportionate with the risks and 
benefits involved in such innovative products and services and is based on an understanding of 
the gaps and barriers in existing regulation.   
9.  Framework:  Consider  the  following  in  the  regulatory  framework,  reflecting  international 
standards,  national  circumstances  and  support  for  a  competitive  landscape:  an  appropriate, 
flexible,  risk-based  Anti-Money  Laundering  and  Combating  the  Financing  of  Terrorism 
(AML/CFT) regime; conditions for the use of agents as a customer interface; a clear regulatory 
regime for electronically stored value; and market-based incentives to achieve the long-term goal 
of broad interoperability and interconnection. 
 
These principles are a reflection of the conditions conducive to spurring innovation for financial inclusion 
while protecting financial stability and consumers.  They are not a rigid set of requirements but are 
designed to help guide policymakers in the decision making process. They are flexible enough so they can 
be adapted to different country contexts. 
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ANNEX 5. Morocco: Microcredit Portfolio Repayment Crisis and Recovery 
Morocco‟s microfinance sector grew fast, with the total loan portfolio multiplying 11 times between 2004 
and 2007. It was seen as a regional leader. However, in 2007 some signs of stress - notably clients‟ over-
indebtedness  and  loan  delinquency  -  started  to  emerge.  A  study  conducted  by  Planet  Finance
16 
highlighted the concentration of microcredit loans and the development of multiple lending in urban 
areas. Non-performing loans started to rise significantly from one of the lowest levels of the world, 0.42% 
in 2003, to 1.9% in 2007. The sharp rise in non-performing loans took place in 2008 and affected all 
MFIs. Portfolio at risk (30 days) increased significantly to 5% in December 2008 and reached an alarming 
level of 10% in June 2009. In May 2009 Zakoura, one of the Moroccan flagship institutions, became 
insolvent  and  was  forced  to  merge  with  another  institution.  Some  MFIs  are  still  facing  serious 
management and portfolio quality challenges.  
The roots of the credit crisis can be found in the institutional capacity of microcredit associations. The 
unprecedented  growth  overstretched  their  capacity,  translating  into  lenient  credit  policies,  obsolete 
Management Information Systems (MIS) systems, lack of internal controls and substandard governance. 
Multiple lending to the same clients was an aggravating factor. A study conducted by the central bank 
estimated that 40% of microcredit beneficiaries had more than one loan. The problem is particularly acute 
in urban areas.  
Microcredit associations have put in place recovery plans that include management changes and freezing 
new disbursements. Associations are tightening their credit processes, putting in place teams focusing on 
loan recovery, and are taking judicial action with a demonstration effect on delinquent borrowers. They 
are  also  exchanging  credit  information  on  a  weekly  basis  to  control  over-indebtedness.  Smaller 
microcredit associations are planning to share resources such as back office systems or to merge.  These 
efforts are slowly paying off. However, some associations have been severely hit and will have to be 
restructured; others are emerging stronger and well positioned for another phase of growth.  
The Ministry of Finance organized the merger acquisition of the worst affected association, Zakoura, by 
the Fondation des Banques Populaires, a large microcredit association backed by the Banque Centrale 
Populaire, to restore confidence and avoid further contagion effects on loan delinquency.
17 A directive 
was prepared to strengthen the governance of the associations and introduce tighter financial reporting 
requirements. The Moroccan government also secured 46 million USD in donor funding to support the 
sector, provide new liquidity, and strengthen management information systems and internal control.   
A credit bureau was launched in October 2009, with borrower information from the leading microcredit 
associations included. This was a major step forward that allows microcredit associations and banks to 
improve credit analysis as well as to control client over–indebtedness.   
The Ministry of Finance has launched a survey with funding from the Millennium Challenge Corporation 
to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the sector and to provide recommendations to improve the 
regulatory framework for microfinance.  The study will also look at the transformation of some of the 
largest institutions into commercial, prudentially regulated, entities.  
Sources:  Reille, 2010; MIX, Sanabel, CGAP, 2010; Microfinance Information Exchange 
 
                                                           
16 Planet Finance survey on multiple lending in the microcredit sector in Morocco, unpublished.   
17  While the merger acquisition of Zakoura was announced in May 2009, and Fondation de Banques Populaires 
(FBP) has taken over management responsibility, there are legal issues remaining to fully complete the merger.  